

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 151509
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TAGS: SHUM, TH, US

SUBJECT: OAKLEY STATEMENT TO FRASER SUBCOMMITTEE

REF: BANGKOK 14016

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OAKLEY'S STATEMENT BEFORE THE FRASER SUBCOMMITTEE ON
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THAILAND:

BEGIN TEXT
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PAGE 02 STATE 151509

JUNE 30, 1977

MR. CHAIRMAN, GENTLEMEN: SEVERAL ASIAN COUNTRIES FIGURE
PROMINENTLY IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S AND THIS COMMITTEE'S
COMMITMENT TO IMPROVE HUMAN RIGHTS WORLDWIDE. I, THERE-
FORE, WELCOME THIS OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THAILAND'S
HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD, AND TO PUT THAT RECORD INTO THE
CONTEXT OF THE PREVAILING SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

GIVEN THE WIDESPREAD INTEREST IN THE EVENTS SURROUND-

ING THE CHANGE IN THE THAI GOVERNMENT LAST OCTOBER, IT SEEMS APPROPRIATE TO BEGIN WITH A DESCRIPTION OF THOSE EVENTS. THE THREE PRECEDING YEARS OF DEMOCRACY IN

THAILAND WERE AN ANOMALY IN THAI POLITICAL HISTORY WHICH HAS HAD A SERIES OF RELATIVELY STABLE, MILITARY-BACKED GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1938. UNFORTUNATELY, THESE THREE YEARS WERE ALSO MARKED BY AN UNUSUAL AMOUNT OF SOCIAL UNREST, AS THE TRADITIONAL PATTERNS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR WERE CHALLENGED BY NEW ONES. IN THIS HEADY, UNCERTAIN ATMOSPHERE RIGHT AND LEFT WING ELEMENTS FOUGHT EACH OTHER IN THE STREETS, THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY WAS ATTACKED AND BURNED BY STUDENTS OF A RIVAL SCHOOL, AND EVEN STRIKING POLICE TOOK THE LAW INTO THEIR OWN HANDS WHEN THEY SACKED THE PRIME MINISTER'S OWN HOME. IT WAS A PERIOD OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY DURING WHICH FOUR SEPARATE THAI GOVERNMENTS WERE IN POWER. THE KHUKRIT GOVERNMENT, WHICH SURVIVED THE LONGEST OF THE FOUR, CONSISTED OF A COALITION OF NO LESS THAN 16 SEPARATE POLITICAL PARTIES.

BY OCTOBER 1976, THERE HAD BEEN A SERIES OF DOMESTIC POLITICAL CRISES WHICH BEGAN WITH THE RETURN OF FORMER LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 03 STATE 151509

THAI PRIME MINISTER THANOM FROM SELF-IMPOSED EXILE. THERE HAD BEEN LARGE-SCALE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD UNEXPECTEDLY RESIGNED WHEN CRITICIZED BY THE LEADERSHIP OF HIS OWN PARTY, LATER AGREEING TO RECONSTRUCT HIS COALITION GOVERNMENT. A RESHUFFLED CABINET UNDER PRIME MINISTER SENI WAS SWORN IN BY THE KING ON OCTOBER 5. THE CABINET WAS, HOWEVER, DIVIDED INTO MUTUALLY-ANTAGONISTIC FACTIONS. NUMEROUS CIVILIAN AND MILITARY GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS OF ALL POLITICAL PERSUASIONS WERE ATTEMPTING TO FOMENT AND TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE INCREASINGLY UNSTABLE POLITICAL SITUATION.

THE EVENT WHICH FINALLY IGNITED THIS INCENDIARY SITUATION WAS A STUDENT RALLY AT THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY ON OCTOBER 5. RIGHT WING GROUPS ORGANIZED LARGE COUNTER DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING WHAT THEY CLAIMED HAD BEEN A GROSS ACT OF STUDENT DISRESPECT FOR THE CROWN PRINCE. ON OCTOBER 6, POLICE UNITS, AT THE ORDER OF PRIME MINISTER SENI PRAMOT, MOVED TO ARREST THE LEADERS OF THOSE STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS. THE ARMED CONFRONTATION RESULTING FROM THIS POLICE ACTION WAS FURTHER COMPOUNDED BY FIGHTING BETWEEN RIGHT AND LEFT WING GROUPS IN AND AROUND THE CAMPUS. THE VIOLENCE LEFT 40 DEAD AND APPROXIMATELY 3,000 PERSONS, MOSTLY STUDENTS, ARRESTED. MEANWHILE, IN ANOTHER PART OF BANGKOK LATER THAT DAY, A MOB OF SOME 50,000 PEOPLE, DRAWN LARGELY FROM VOCATIONAL STUDENTS AND RURAL GROUPS,

DEMONSTRATED IN FRONT OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
DEMANDING THE RESIGNATION OF THE CABINET.

PRIME MINISTER SENI APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN OVER-
WHELMED BY EVENTS AND UNABLE TO DEAL WITH THE SITUA-
TION. SIX HOURS LATER, IN THE WAKE OF THIS VIOLENCE,
FACED WITH GOVERNMENTAL PARALYSIS AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF FURTHER URBAN DEMONSTRATIONS AND VIOLENCE ON A
MASSIVE SCALE, THE SENIOR COMMANDERS OF THE THAI MILI-
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PAGE 04 STATE 151509

TARY TOOK CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT.

AROUND THE WORLD, TELEVISION AND PRESS PHOTO
COVERAGE OF THE VIOLENCE AT THAMMASAT WAS REPORTED
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE NEWS OF THE COUP D'ETAT.
THE RESULTING ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION IN THE MINDS OF
MANY WAS THAT THE THAI MILITARY HAD BRUTALLY SEIZED
CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT. IN FACT, THE COUP WAS
BLOODLESS. THE THAI MILITARY DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN
THE VIOLENCE AT THAMMASAT, NOR WERE ANY MEMBERS OF
THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT INJURED OR ARRESTED. THE
COMMANDER OF THE POLICE--WHO MUST BEAR SOME RESPONSI-
BILITY FOR THE SAVAGE VIOLENCE AT THAMMASAT--WAS
REPLACED BY THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES. HOWEVER, NO
DISCIPLINARY ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THE POLICE.

THE SENIOR THAI MILITARY OFFICERS WHO SEIZED
CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT STATED THAT IT WAS NOT
THEIR INTENTION TO GOVERN THE COUNTRY DIRECTLY. TWO
DAYS AFTER THE COUP, THE KING APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER
THANIN UPON THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE MILITARY. ON
OCTOBER 22, A CIVILIAN CABINET WAS ANNOUNCED AND A
NEW CONSTITUTION PROMULGATED.

WHILE THE CURRENT REGIME IS ULTIMATELY DEPENDENT
UPON THE BACKING OF THE THAI MILITARY, THE PRIME
MINISTER AND HIS CABINET HAVE CONSIDERABLE INDEPENDENCE.
SENIOR THAI MILITARY COMMANDERS HAVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY
TO ACT AS THE PRIME MINISTER'S ADVISORY COUNCIL, AND IT
APPEARS THAT THAT BODY SETS THE ESSENTIAL GUIDELINES OF
GOVERNMENT POLICY, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO MATTERS
AFFECTING NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY. THE
PRIME MINISTER AND HIS CIVILIAN CABINET, HOWEVER, SIG-
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PAGE 05 STATE 151509

NIFICANTLY CONTRIBUTE TO POLICY AS WELL AS ADMINISTER-
ING THE DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS OF THE THAI GOVERNMENT.

DURING THE THREE YEARS OF DEMOCRATIC RULE, THAILAND HAD CIVIL AND POLITICAL LIBERTIES COMPARABLE TO OUR OWN. THE MILITARY'S ACTION TO END THE THAI DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT REPRESENTED TO MANY THAI A NECESSARY SACRIFICE IF THE COUNTRY WAS TO STABILIZE ITSELF AND SUCCESSFULLY FACE THE GROWING THREAT FROM HOSTILE COMMUNIST NEIGHBORS.

IN HIS APRIL 30 ADDRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY, SECRETARY VANCE DEFINED OUR CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE BROAD CATEGORIES OF INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, VITAL HUMAN NEEDS, AND POLITICAL LIBERTIES. I WOULD LIKE TO BRIEFLY REVIEW THAILAND'S RECORD AS IT RELATES TO THAT DEFINITION.

WITH RESPECT TO INTEGRITY OF THE PERSON, THERE IS NO SPECIFIC DECLARATION OF THE PEOPLE'S RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE THAI CONSTITUTION. THAI COURTS, HOWEVER, CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO A LEGAL CODE BASED ON WESTERN EUROPEAN MODELS. IN EFFECT, THOSE TRIED IN THAILAND ARE ALLOWED BASICALLY THE SAME RIGHTS AS THE ACCUSED IN THE UNITED STATES.

THERE ARE, HOWEVER, CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF MARTIAL LAW IN EFFECT IN THAILAND SINCE OCTOBER 7 THAT CAN BE USED TO SUPERSEDE THAI LAW, AND THESE PROVISIONS PRESENT A PROBLEM OF DUE PROCESS AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY. UNDER ORDER 22, THERE ARE NINE CATEGORIES OF VIOLATIONS WHICH CAN BE CAUSE FOR ARREST AND IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT RECOURSE TO NORMAL THAI LEGAL PROCEDURE. SIX CATEGORIES INVOLVE CRIMINAL ACTIVITY WHILE THREE CATEGORIES POTENTIALLY INVOLVE POLITICAL CONDUCT. SINCE THE OCTOBER COUP, MORE THAN 3,000 THAI CITIZENS HAVE BEEN DETAINED UNDER THESE NINE CATEGORIES. AT PRESENT, THERE ARE APPROXIMATE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PAGE 06 STATE 151509

MATELY 1,000 PERSONS IN DETENTION. THE VAST MAJORITY OF THESE PRISONERS ARE CONSIDERED PETTY CRIMINALS AND ARE DETAINED IN REFORM CENTERS FOR PERIODS LASTING TWO TO SIX MONTHS. THE DETENTION OF MOST OF THESE PEOPLE APPEARS TO BE A GENUINE EFFORT TO REFORM A CRIMINAL ELEMENT IN THAI SOCIETY. THE THAI GOVERNMENT HAS, HOWEVER, IDENTIFIED 64 OF THE PRISONERS CURRENTLY BEING HELD AS VIOLATORS OF ONE OF THE THREE CATEGORIES OF ORDER 22 THAT HAS A POLITICAL BASIS.

WE HAVE NO WAY OF ASCERTAINING THE NUMBER OF PRISONERS, WHOSE ARREST MAY BE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. HOWEVER, POLITICAL OR NOT, ALL THESE PEOPLE ARE HELD WITHOUT DUE PROCESS. THE CASES OF ALL ORDER 22 PRISONERS ARE REVIEWED EVERY TWO MONTHS AND RELEASES

MADE. THE LAST WAS ON MAY 11 WHEN 613 WERE FREED, 43 OF WHOM THAI AUTHORITIES IDENTIFIED AS "POLITICAL" PRISONERS. WE KNOW OF NO REPORTS THAT THOSE DETAINED HAVE SUFFERED TORTURE, CRUEL, OR INHUMAN TREATMENT.

OF THE 3,000 PERSONS, MOSTLY STUDENTS, ARRESTED AT THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY ON OCTOBER 6 BEFORE THE COUP, ALL BUT 23 HAVE BEEN RELEASED OR ARE FREE ON BAIL.

FORMAL CHARGES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AGAINST 110 OF THOSE PERSONS ARRESTED BEFORE THE COUP ARE BEING CONSIDERED, BUT THE DEPARTMENT IS INFORMED THAT NOT ALL OF THEM ARE LIKELY TO BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL. IN RESPONSE TO AN EXPRESSION OF CONCERN BY OUR EMBASSY IN BANGKOK, THE THAI GOVERNMENT HAS ASSURED US THAT NORMAL THAI LEGAL PROCEDURES WILL BE FOLLOWED FOR THOSE BROUGHT TO TRIAL. SUMMARY JUSTICE UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION WILL NOT BE EMPLOYED, AND THE COURTROOM LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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PAGE 07 STATE 151509

WILL BE OPEN TO BOTH PRESS AND PUBLIC. WE INTEND TO HAVE AN EMBASSY OFFICER PRESENT.

WITH RESPECT TO THE SECOND CATEGORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS OUTLINED BY SECRETARY VANCE, THE THAI GOVERNMENT HAS DEMONSTRATED A COMMITMENT TO THE PROVISION OF ESSENTIAL FOOD, SHELTER, HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION FOR THE THAI PEOPLE. THE THAI GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET PROVIDES FOR CONTINUING EFFORTS TO EXPAND PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLING. HIGHER UNIVERSITY EDUCATION IN THAILAND IS ONE OF THE FINEST AND LARGEST IN ASIA WITH 32 UNIVERSITIES IN OPERATION. THE THANIN GOVERNMENT IS PROMOTING LAND REFORM AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT. THERE ARE SPECIAL EDUCATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS FOR MINORITY POPULATIONS, INCLUDING THE KING'S HILLTRIBE PROJECT. THERE IS A MINIMUM WAGE LAW AND A RICE PRICE SUBSIDY FOR THE URBAN POOR. THE THAI GOVERNMENT IS APPRECIATIVE OF THE MODEST U.S. AID PROGRAM OF \$14 MILLION IN FY 77 AND ACCEPTS SOML ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES AS WELL AS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. HOWEVER, MOST OF THE FUNDS AND PERSONNEL FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN THAILAND COME FROM DOMESTIC THAI RESOURCES.

THE THIRD CATEGORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEAL WITH THOSE CIVIL AND POLITICAL LIBERTIES WHICH WE HOLD SO FUNDAMENTAL TO OUR OWN SYSTEM. THE CURRENT THAI GOVERNMENT IS NON-ELECTIVE AND POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE BEEN DISBANDED, ALTHOUGH THERE IS A FORMAL COMMITMENT TO A COMPLICATED 12-YEAR FORMULA UNDER WHICH FULL DEMOCRACY MAY BE RESTORED TO THAILAND. THERE ARE STILL ELECTED VILLAGE LEADERS THAT CONTINUE TO ADMINISTER GOVERNMENT

AT THE LOCAL LEVEL. POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS, NO LONGER ABLE TO FORM POLITICAL PARTIES, HAVE REVERTED TO THE MORE TRADITIONAL THAI NETWORK OF PERSONAL CONTACTS TO INFLUENCE GOVERNMENT POLICY. STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BEEN SIMILARLY BARRED, BUT UNIONS CONTINUE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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PAGE 08 STATE 151509

TO FUNCTION ALTHOUGH THEY ARE LEGALLY CONSTRAINED FROM STRIKE ACTION. THIS LIMITATION ON LABOR IS A SERIOUS CONSTRAINT, AND THE THAI GOVERNMENT IS CONSIDERING SUCH ALTERNATIVES AS A BOARD OF BINDING ARBITRATION.

THERE IS NO FORMAL PRESS CENSORSHIP, BUT SOME NEWSPAPERS HAVE OCCASIONALLY HAD THEIR LICENSES REVOKED. MOST PAPERS WHICH HAVE HAD THEIR PUBLICATION SUSPENDED HAVE RESUMED OPERATION WITHIN SEVERAL WEEKS. SOME, CURIOUSLY, MERELY CHANGED THE NAME OF THE PAPER SLIGHTLY AND RECEIVED A NEW LICENSE.

THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE PRESIDENT CARTER'S VIEWS ON HUMAN RIGHTS VERY CLEARLY KNOWN TO THAI GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, BOTH HERE AND IN THAILAND, INCLUDING OUR VIEW THAT A STATE OF EMERGENCY CANNOT JUSTIFY THE COMMISSION OF VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. IT IS OUR JUDGMENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND UNDERSTANDS THESE VIEWS AND THAT IT IS, FOR ITS REASONS, BECOMING MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THERE HAS RECENTLY BEEN INCREASED EMPHASIS UPON RURAL DEVELOPMENT, AS WELL AS A CONSIDERABLE REDUCTION IN THE NUMBERS OF PRISONERS HELD UNDER ORDER 22. ALSO, THE FEW PERSONS STILL CHARGED BECAUSE OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE EVENTS OF OCTOBER 1976 WILL SOON BE TRIED WHILE THE REST HAVE BEEN FREED.

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THAILAND CANNOT BE DISCUSSED IN A VACUUM, GIVEN ITS GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION ABUTTING THE COMMUNIST STATES OF CAMBODIA AND LAOS, ITS PROXIMITY TO VIETNAM, AND THE HISTORY OF ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE INDOCHINA STATES AND THAILAND. A JUSTIFICATION GIVEN FOR NOT RETURNING TO THE OPEN, POLITICALLY-EFFERVESCENT,
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PAGE 09 STATE 151509

DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM WHICH PREVAILED FROM 1973 TO 1976 IS THE THREAT POSED BY THESE STATES, INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR THE COMMUNIST INSURGENCIES IN THAILAND'S NORTH, NORTHEAST AND SOUTH. THAI FEELINGS OF VULNERABILITY HAVE BEEN INCREASED BY THE REMOVAL OF THE U.S. MILITARY FROM THAILAND AND THE HUGE AMOUNTS OF U.S. ARMS LEFT IN THE

HANDS OF THE VIETNAMESE--SOME OF WHICH HAVE BEEN SENT TO LAOS.

ONE CAN DRAW ONE'S OWN CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE DEGREE TO WHICH THIS SITUATION HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE NATURE OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, I WISH TO DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION TO ANOTHER IMPORTANT POINT--THE EFFECT WHICH MASSIVE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE INDOCHINA COUNTRIES HAS UPON THAILAND. THIS COMMITTEE HAS ALREADY HAD HEARINGS ON VIETNAM AND WILL DO SO SOON ON CAMBODIA. THUS, THERE IS NO NEED TO GO INTO DETAIL ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS IN INDOCHINA. SUFFICE IT TO SAY THAT OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS, SOME 120,000 REFUGEES FROM INDOCHINA HAVE SOUGHT REFUGE IN THAILAND. THEY SEE THAILAND AS BEING SO FAR PREFERABLE TO THE SITUATIONS

OF POVERTY AND REPRESSIONS WHICH EXIST IN THEIR COUNTRIES THAT THEY TAKE GREAT RISKS TO ESCAPE. DESPITE THE THREAT OF ARREST OR DEATH FROM TROOPS WHO HAVE ORDERS TO FIRE UPON THOSE ATTEMPTING TO FLEE, OVER 1,000 REFUGEES A MONTH CONTINUE TO POUR INTO THAILAND. DESPITE THE SERIOUS ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THESE REFUGEES, THE THAI DO NOT TURN THEM BACK, ALTHOUGH THEY SOMETIMES ARE TEMPTED TO DO SO.

THUS, IN ADDITION TO THE ACTION IT IS TAKING TO IMPROVE THE WELFARE OF ITS OWN PEOPLE, THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THAILAND ARE MAKING A SUBSTANTIAL HUMAN RIGHTS CONTRIBUTION TO THOSE WHO ARE LESS FORTUNATE
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PAGE 10 STATE 151509

THAN THEY. INDEED THEY ARE SECOND ONLY TO THE UNITED STATES IN PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO INDOCHINA REFUGEES. THEY DESERVE OUR COMMENDATION AND OUR FINANCIAL SUPPORT IN THIS EFFORT, ONE WHICH THEY KNOW MUST BE CONTINUED FOR SEVERAL YEARS TO COME, GIVEN THE SHARPLY CONTRASTING HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN INDOCHINA. END TEXT.

2. THE FOLLOWING NUMBERED RESPONSES ARE KEYED TO CHAIRMAN FRASER'S QUESTIONS CONTAINED IN A LETTER TO SECRETARY VANCE. THESE RESPONSES FORM A SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT TO MR. OAKLEY'S TESTIMONY:

BEGIN TEXT

(1) THE CURRENT STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THAILAND IS THE SUBJECT OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OAKLEY'S OPENING STATEMENT BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THAILAND.

(2) WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION ABOUT THE EXTENT OF U.S. COMMENT ON THE OCTOBER 6, 1976 COUP D'ETAT IN THAILAND, THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN STATED ON OCTOBER 14 THAT "THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, WHATEVER ADMINISTRATION--HAS ALWAYS FAVORED--IF WE HAD OUR DRUTHERS, WE ALWAYS PREFER A DEMOCRACY OR A DEMOCRATIC FORM OF GOVERNMENT". SINCE THEN, THE DEPARTMENT HAS REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATIONS WHICH HAVE THEIR ROOTS IN THE TERMINATION OF DEMOCRACY IN THAILAND.

(3) THE STATUS OF PRISONERS FACING TRIAL IS CONTAINED IN MR. OAKLEY'S REMARKS.

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PAGE 11 STATE 151509

(4) AS IS COMMON PRACTICE WITH RESPECT TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE RAISED ON SEVERAL

OCCASIONS IN WASHINGTON AND IN BANGKOK THE U.S. GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS DEVELOPMENTS. GENERAL KRIANGSAK IS AMONG THOSE OFFICIALS.

(5) WE HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE THAT U.S. EQUIPMENT PROVIDED TO THE THAI ARMED FORCES THROUGH THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM HAS FOUND ITS WAY INTO THE HANDS OF ANY GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL FOR WHICH IT WAS NOT INTENDED. THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP (JUSMAG) IN BANGKOK IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CONSTANTLY MONITORING THE END USE OF U.S. EQUIPMENT PROVIDED TO THE THAI ARMED FORCES.

(6) THE BORDER PATROL POLICE (BPP) IS A UNIT OF THE THAI NATIONAL POLICE DEPARTMENT SPECIFICALLY CHARGED WITH THE SECURITY OF THAILAND'S BORDER AREAS. ONE OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE U.S. ANTI-NARCOTICS PROGRAM IN THAILAND HAS BEEN TO ASSIST THE THAI GOVERNMENT INTERDICT THE ILLICIT FLOW OF NARCOTICS ACROSS ITS BORDERS. CONSEQUENTLY, WE HAVE PROVIDED RADIOS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT TO IMPROVE BPP COMMUNICATIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN THE DIFFICULT TERRAIN OF THAILAND'S BORDER AREAS. WE HAVE NOT PROVIDED ARMS TO THE BPP. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT ANY U.S.-SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT WAS USED BY THE BPP AT THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY. U.S. PROVIDED HELICOPTERS ARE USED BY THE BPP BUT ARE THE SPECIFIC PROPERTY OF THE THAI NATIONAL POLICE AVIATION DIVISION. WITH RESPECT TO END USE MONITORING OF U.S. ANTI-NARCOTICS EQUIPMENT, OUR EMBASSY IN BANGKOK IS STAFFED WITH AN AVIATION ADVISOR TO THE THAI POLICE AVIATION DIVISION AND TWO AID NARCOTIC ADVISORS. THESE OFFICERS HAVE SPECIFIC END USE MONITORING RESPONSIBILITIES. HOW-

EVER, EVERY SINGLE OFFICER OF THE U.S. MISSION IN
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PAGE 12 STATE 151509

BANGKOK IS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO REPORT ANY INFRACTION
OF THE U.S.-THAI AGREEMENTS ON THE USE OF U.S.-SUPPLIED
NARCOTICS CONTROL EQUIPMENT.

(7) WE HAVE HAD NO CONFIRMATION OF THE REPORT THAT
PEOPLE HAVE BEEN DROPPED FROM THAI AIRCRAFT AND NO
REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE REPORT IS ACCURATE.

WITH RESPECT TO THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY CONFERENCE AT
LOP BURI, THAILAND IN EARLY 1977, U.S. MILITARY OB-
SERVERS WERE INVITED AND DID ATTEND. THE U.S. AND
THAILAND CONTINUE TO COOPERATE ON SECURITY MATTERS
AND OUR ATTENDANCE AT THAT CONFERENCE WAS ENTIRELY
CONSISTENT WITH THAT RELATIONSHIP.

(8) AS POINTED OUT IN THE QUESTION, U.S. DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE HAS DECLINED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS,
INCLUDING THOSE YEARS WHEN THAILAND HAD A DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT. THIS DECLINE REPRESENTED A JUDGMENT ABOUT
RELATIVE NEED IN RELATION TO APPROPRIATED FUNDS.

(9) TO THE CONTRARY, THAILAND CONTINUES TO ATTACH
GREAT IMPORTANCE TO UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE IN BOTH
THE ECONOMIC AND SECURITY FIELD. THIS IS NOT ONLY THE
CONCLUSION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUT ALSO OF THE
REPORT OF A SPECIAL STUDY MISSION TO ASIA BY MEMBERS
OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS OF
THE HIRC, PUBLISHED ON JUNE 19, 1977. MOREOVER, THE
RTG IS SHOWING GREATER, NOT LESSER, INTEREST IN RURAL
DEVELOPMENT AND OTHER PROGRAMS WHICH REQUIRE ASSISTANCE
FROM FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS SUCH AS THE U.S. AND JAPAN AS
WELL AS INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

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PAGE 13 STATE 151509

(10) ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS DURING MR. OAKLEY'S VISIT
TO THAILAND, HE SPECIFICALLY RAISED CIVIL AND POLITI-
CAL RIGHTS AS AN ISSUE OF CONCERN TO THE U.S. GOVERN-
MENT, AS WELL AS EXPLAINING THE OTHER ASPECTS OF U.S.
HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY AS SET FORTH BY THE SECRETARY OF
STATE.

(11) THE END OF THE WAR IN INDOCHINA MARKED THE BEGIN-
NING OF THE "NEW BASIS" FOR U.S.-THAI RELATIONS OF
WHICH MR. OAKLEY SPOKE IN HIS BANGKOK PRESS CONFERENCE.

THE TERMINATION OF THE INDOCHINA CONFLICT ALTERED
FUNDAMENTALLY THE U.S. INTEREST IN THAILAND AS A
BASE FOR U.S. ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST COMMUNIST
FORCES IN THE AREA. FROM A HIGH OF 46,000 AMERICAN
TROOPS, SEVEN AMERICAN AIR BASES AND HUNDREDS OF AMERI-
CAN COMBAT PLANES IN THAILAND IN 1969, ALL U.S. MILITARY
FORCES WERE WITHDRAWN BY MID-1976, AND THE SIZE OF THE
MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP IS RAPIDLY DECLIN-
ING, REACHING A LEVEL OF NO MORE THAN 40 DURING FY 1978.

WITH THE DECLINE IN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S.-THAI
SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, A MORE BALANCED, NORMAL AND
CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP THAN THAT OF A DECADE AGO
IS DEVELOPING. WE NO LONGER SEEK NOR DO THE THAI
DESIRE THE PREVIOUS DEGREE OF MUTUAL DEPENDENCE. THE
U.S. HAS AN IMPORTANT GENERAL INTEREST IN A SOVEREIGN,
INDEPENDENT THAILAND, FREE OF SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL
INFLUENCE INIMICAL TO THE U.S. SUCH A THREAT TO THAI-
LAND IS MOST LIKELY TO BE FROM THE COMMUNIST STATES
OF INDOCHINA. SPECIFIC U.S. POLICY INTERESTS WHICH
HAVE GAINED GREATER ATTENTION IN THE POST-INDOCHINA

WAR ENVIRONMENT INCLUDE HUMAN RIGHTS, ANTI-NARCOTICS
COOPERATION, THAI SUPPORT ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES OF
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE U.S., GENERAL CULTURAL AND EDU-
CATIONAL EXCHANGE ACTIVITIES, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
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PAGE 14 STATE 151509

AND U.S.-THAI TRADE. THAILAND'S CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN
REGIONAL (PARTICULARLY ASEAN) ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT IS ALSO OF IMPORTANCE TO U.S. INTERESTS,
AS WELL AS TO THOSE OF JAPAN, AUSTRALIA AND THE EEC,
ALL OF WHOM ARE CONSULTING WITH ASEAN.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THAILAND AND SOUTHEAST ASIA TO THE
UNITED STATES IS SET FORTH IN THE REPORT OF THE SUB-
COMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS OF THE HIRC,
PUBLISHED ON JUNE 19.

(12) THE DEPARTMENT HAS MADE KNOWN REPEATEDLY ITS
INTEREST IN THE FURTHERING OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
RIGHTS IN THAILAND. WE BELIEVE THAT PROGRESS IN THIS
AREA IS IMPORTANT TO THE FUTURE OF THAILAND. BY MEANS
OF OUR DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS AS WELL AS THE DIRECTION OF
OUR MODEST ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, WE ARE TRYING TO EN-
COURAGE GREATER EMPHASIS UPON HUMAN RIGHTS, INDIVIDUAL
LIBERTIES AND DUE PROCESS AS WELL AS UPON IMPROVING
THE LOT OF THE POORER SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION.
END TEXT. CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

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Drafter: EA/TB:RASMITH:MGH
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Expiration:
Film Number: D770232-1164
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t197706110/baaaetdr.tel
Line Count: 542
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 51209e73-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN EA
Original Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: BANGKOK 14016
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2013459
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: OAKLEY STATEMENT TO FRASER SUBCOMMITTEE
TAGS: SHUM, TH, US, (OAKLEY, ROBERT)
To: BANGKOK DOD MULTIPLE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/51209e73-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009